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Abstract—Over the past decade, the trustworthiness of biomet-
rics during authentication, and mostly, verification processes has
been compromised by spoofing attackers sprang up to exploit the
security gaps. With the term of spoofing, a non-colluding honest
and unauthorized entity tries to fake somebody else’s identity by
presenting fake samples of that person’s traits, or tries to gain
benefit from the “leakage” of stored biometric information in
a database or an electronic chip. Despite that specific recent
literature efforts are devoted to studying model threats for
biometrics, however prevention mechanisms and problems raised
by malicious actions for more complicated systems have not
received much attention. This paper presents crypto-biometrics
analyzing comparatively the different categories, according to
the main goal of the design and the methodology used in. The
issue of spoofing against schemes that combine single traits
or multiple biometrics with cryptography is covered. Finally,
as an illustration, a bimodal system’s anti-spoofing behavior is
suggested, ensuring that such kind of attacks can be rejected.
The aim of this multidisciplinary work is to organize the current
approaches on how to develop and ensure privacy and security
in crypto-biometric techniques, pinpoint the areas with potential
for improvement, contributing to research for addressing fraud
acts and intrusions in real-world cases.
Keywords: biometrics, cryptography, cryptosystems, template
protection, spoofing, deception, prevention techniques, ePass-
port
I. INTRODUCTION
Admittedly, biometric enabled systems have replaced the
traditional forms of individuals’ recognition of his/her pres-
ence, access to a domain or log in to an account. Automated
identity management, using face, hand or fingerprints, has
become an experience in everyday life, mainly due to their
diffusion in technologies such as electronic passports or IDs.
From border control, to log on computers, mailing and eBank-
ing services, biometrics constitute a unique and integral part
of the user, to whom are associated with, and this is a serious
tangible reason for being vulnerable to activities which threat
to compromise not only reliability of the application, but also
security and privacy rights of the person.
A closer look at the explanation for any extensive attack to
fields related to biometrics will lead to the nature of the data,
the personal non-biometric information that may be stored and
correlated or other private facts such as the medical condition
of the user that may be enclosed and revealed on occasions
where someone’s identity is not appropriately protected. The
special assumption when a biometric trait is compromised,
then it can not be canceled and renewed. Moreover, it may be
used to create gelatin genetic clones of fingerprints, contact
lens with a copy of iris or retinal scans, artificial replicas of
faces, or facial samples in the form of photographs. Voice or
even gait can be recorded, inducing a system to falsely infer a
presence under another’s identity. A behavioral biometric such
as signature, handwriting are not stolen, under the classical
term, but can be easily mimicked and used to a certain
degree for illegal means. These concerns have given space
to public debates on the pressing matter of confidence in
authorized, biometry compulsive systems and hence, societal,
ethical themes.
As an address to the challenges of strengthened privacy
for human characteristics, a range of standards and security
methodologies have been suggested. Standard conventional
cryptographic algorithms have been characterized, simply, as
not enough, because they do not allow and support comparison
between template and fresh sample caught on sensor, thus
making the system possibly be cheated. In this philosophy,
biometric template protection schemes have been deployed.
The basic idea is the secured form of the stored template,
making it unusable without authorization, but still capable for
recognition its true energetic owner. The approaches try to
follow the requirements of accuracy, irreversibility, diversity,
unlinkability, revocability. At the direction of enhancing se-
curity and privacy information and overcome drawbacks in
both areas, the combinations of biometrics with cryptogra-
phy techniques were born [1]. Crypto-biometric systems or
biometric cryptosystems, as they are denoted in this paper,
respect the previously referred compulsions and additionally
can obtain cryptographic/crypto-bio keys strongly linked to the
user’s identity.
Although crypto-biometrics propose alternative solutions,
biometric recognition systems are still suffering and some-
times defeated by intruders. Vulnerabilities primarily include
direct and indirect attacks performed at the sensor level,
or correspondingly, inside the parts of the system, such as
communication channels, storage domain, feature and matcher
extractions. Direct operations happen when an attacker tries
to masquerade as a valid and authorized user by changing
his/her biometric characteristics, claiming a different identity
posing himself/herself or presenting false traits. Surprisingly,
multi-biometric systems, based on their sources, separated to
multi -sensors, -recorded samples, -algorithmics, -units and
-modals, are constitute a more difficult, but not impossible
target. Ideally, several mechanisms have been tried for the
defense of security for the involved items in a system, with
controversial results. From a realistic point of research, aca-
demic and industrial trials on detection, encryption and anti-
spoofing measures have been proposed to deal, in some extent,
with these threats.
This work is motivated by recent advances in the scientific
field of biometric system security, in general, and protected
templates to ensure the privacy of person’s identity. Its target
is to present and add new information to the studies against
fraud processes to biometric based verification technologies,
something that since 2012 is indicated as well, from the
increasing number of projects aim to suggest ideas for prevent-
ing risks, directly applicable to special cases, such as border
control issues. Our essential objective here is to clarify the
role of cryptology in biometrics, and examine how honest
is the statement for a safe and reliable biometric application
environment, when this is constantly exposed to human mind’s
contrivances. The remainder of this paper is organized as
follows: In the next sections, a thorough summarized review
on research articles is analyzed. The fourth part is writ-
ten to bridge the gap between single and/or multi-biometric
cryptosystems and spoofing attacks, the privacy standards
and principals. Fifth section aims to present an ePassport
multi-modal model introducing readers to enlightenment, by
evaluating the cryptographic issues against spoofing. As a
conclusion, comprehensive remarks are discussed and future
approaches listed, providing food for thought.
II. PRELIMINARIES ON CRYPTO-BIOMETRICS
A. Biometric Cryptosystems & Protocols
A uniform classification of the various techniques according
to their functionality is described diagrammatically in Figure
1. In the first division, encryption, hashing, transformation and
other cryptographic techniques produce a one-bit verification
for biometric systems. Next in order, data are used to obtain
biometric cryptographic keys. Ordinary biometric systems
requires prior a database which contains stored biometric or
non-biometric references to the data for further comparison
causes. The lack of revocability for each of these pieces and
the very existence of a place from where information could
be leaked, leading to numerous concerns.
For this reason and following the lines of the diagram,
classical encryption of biometric data, such as the Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES) technique, the trait collaborates
with one, or more secrets, like passwords which can be stored
also in a token or smart card, preserving diversity. Cancellable
biometrics category has been studied extensively and inspired
various designs for other proposed methodologies. The basic
Fig. 1. Two main categories of crypto-biometric systems.
ideology can be found in the one-way function re/irre-versible
feature transformations, where there is luxury for multiple
transformed templates and their uses across applications, under
the same identity. At the second cryptosystems’ family, the
creation and reissuance of keys from biometric data constitute
a remarkable and template-free concept. There is a crypto-
graphic framework that is used to securely store just a key born
after enrollment and released only over successful verification.
This key can be irrelevant or stable bit-string directly extracted
from biometrics and in binding approaches can be regenerated,
as it is combined with the biometric data using cryptography
and possible to be retrieved, later.
Protocols for re-generation crypto-biometrics in systems
are come to address the specific ways on how to share the
keys between the untrusted parties of an authorized user/client
and an intended server’s principle, and as a field lacks of
research progress. Symmetric-key cryptography is fast but too
risky because of several cryptanalytic attacks that can occur
in cases when a single key is used for a real-world large
scale application. Public key suggestions are vulnerable to
other kinds of attacks and initially they do not include the
verification of authenticity to each entity. To overcome the
limitations, protocols designs help to share the crypto-bio keys
or create secure authenticated sessions based on biometrics [1].
Indubitably, in every scenario, the verification performance
and the evaluation of the overall function of the crypto-
biometric systems largely depend and based on the baseline
of its system. The error correcting codes algorithms are used
to improve the degrades and analyze any perspectives able
to change, in a better level, each approach. The important
factors are the adoption of multi-biometrics as an emerging
development, understanding that obtaining high entropy keys
is still a challenging, but encouraging issue. The use of
passwords, tokens, electronic documents or smart cards can
secure user’s privacy, the appropriate secured sharing of the
keys based on totally untrusted involved sides on a system
and the ability to combine basic elements from each category
suffice to design new complete hybrid systems.
B. Hotspots at Biometric Systems
The security breaches directly or indirectly, as described
above, may aim towards different parts in system modules.
Eights categories are used for notice the most risky points
for possible threats, such as the generic scheme in Figure 2
portrays. The frame symbolizes the inner aura and attacks that
can take place in that are further divided into three groups [14].
Threats at the communication channels between different parts
of the system, attacks to the feature and matcher extractors,
those ones that could take place under the assumption of
the database of information is compromised. The direct, also
known as spoofing attacks are substantially described at the
next subsection and here indicated as the first spot at the level
of sensor.
Fig. 2. Eight areas in emergency.
An analytical outlook to indirect attacks involves a deviant
and the communication tunnel between user and the valid end
system’s controller. The attacker must mainly know specific
information about the process of the whole application, the
template format, the scores, communications protocol, the
data transmission elements and can perform an access to all
its stages. In this way, the intruder can gain the extraction,
changing, deleting, adding of important data on identities.
Specifically, the communication channels across consecutive
parts of the system can be intercepted by an eavesdropper
who changes surreptitiously the messages in the link, ma-
nipulates the scores, decisions and results or makes brute
force attacks by exhaustively trying to find which input can
unlock the region of interest. During the pre-processing and
feature extraction progresses, insertion of impostor data and
component replacement can happen, while the same could
take place as well at the matcher level with the hill-climbing
algorithms, consisting on iteratively changing some syntheti-
cally generated templates until the one, which can unlock the
system, is found. Finally, the database’s region is characterized
as imperatively dangerous and involves malicious tampering
at the templates from reading to modifications of the links
between biometric data, increasing privacy concerns.
III. THOROUGH LITERATURE SURVEY
A. Spoofing Attacks
In the case of spoofing attacks that may take place directly
towards the initial level of sensor, a zero-effort or active impos-
tor tries to positively claim a different identity deceiving the
acquisition system. The means of this kind attack are highly
depended on the type and quality of design and application.
For the first mentioned, an unauthorized person uses his/her
own trait, which by mistake can be matched to a template. This
cascade effect happens due to dysfunctional false acceptance
rates of a system that make it vulnerable. Obfuscation intents
are carried out without the requirement of advanced technical
skills, by presenting a counterfeited stolen, copied, replicated
biometric and the range includes gummy fingerprints, photos,
three dimensional-3D shaped models or falsification of facial
characteristics using make-up, plastic surgery, imitations or
short video clips for gait, signature or handwriting, recorded
speech modality and voice conversion, high resolution pictures
of iris or even ears. To sum up, sophisticated cheaters have
constantly managed to artistically fool the most smart com-
puter devices simply by taking the advantage of the increasing
popularity of social network websites where photographs are
available, such as facebook, instagram, youtube etc.
Research has proved that none scheme is completely spoof-
proof, since almost all commercial devices by private security
firms are defeated after this kind of attack. However, the issue
is not about the hacked systems but people and this is a
particular challenge, not only in criminal, but also in civil mat-
ters. The implications are gradually increased across different
devices and public services. Depending on the position of the
attack, recently published works have managed to categorize
and evaluate them with regards to the scores of rates that
a system can demonstrate when it is threaten. Insufficient,
sub-optimal, optimal and super-optimal attacks constitute the
terminology for spoofing acts [3].
From an ethical perspective, a deceiver can claim an identity
and gain access to private data or parallel information that
may lead him/her to someone’s car, mobile, computer, house,
electronic passport, totally ruining a personality in society. A
decade ago, all these would be heard like a myth or seen
as a movie scenario, nevertheless, nowadays persons may
well consider such information intimate and part of a broadly
acceptable status quo, and hence demand a vigilance attitude
from companies and authorities, with skeptical position against
any alarming behavior could threaten their interests. Undoubt-
edly, it remains really hard for nonspecialists to assess the
security-low-level parts of a system and perfectly compose
their plan, but still there is the belief about those who if they
are motivated will find an idea on how to get around any
barriers used to protect the targeted system [7]. To overcome
these arguments, applications should be designed following
the security level needed according to its potential purpose,
the scale of the data and concurrently follow privacy by design
rules, covering the ISO Standards, respecting legal provisions.
B. Anti-Spoofing Countermeasures
Up to this point, in research community different methods
have been suggested for facing this long-neglected problem
against many biometric modes, referred as anti-spoofing, spoof
detection or presentation attack detection. By definition, their
role is to confer a highly positive characterization about
system’s trustworthiness [5]. In this way, the major objective
is to ensure the protected environment of an application which
can recognize only genuine users and not detect and prevent
spoofing attacks, as is mistakenly believed. Having this in
mind, the questions about the huge chasm between research
results and real-world applications can be answered [6]. Mind-
ing the gap, the technology of a biometric verification system
should contain by design the incorporation of mechanisms that
reject spoofing attacks and are under alliance with the parts
of the final system considerations and characterize its overall
susceptibility.
One the most familiar and user-comfort technique that is
used for increasing the awkwardness to spoof a system are
passwords or smart cards, offering the opportunity for super-
vising the verification process. Although the way has been
successfully, at some percentage, practiced on transactions,
other recognition applications that require communication be-
tween services and enrolled person, such as travelers’ checks,
need other anti-spoofing methods, involving the combination
of multi-modal biometrics for one identity and liveness detec-
tion. Human physiologic information do not indicate that the
person who is present at the time of capture is actually alive.
Liveness detection tests some data inherent to the biometric
or additional processing of information captured by reader to
extract contextual, discriminating features or extra hardware.
On the same wavelength, pulse oximetry, electrocardiogram,
palm vein, keystroke, typing rhythm, gait, ear acoustic prop-
erties, finger/hand temperature sensing, facial thermograms as
continuous authentication mechanisms and challenge/response
actions describe the cooperation of the user who provides
unintentionally or must do something, like a blink, pupil, lip,
head movement, allowing the system to understand his/her real
presence.
Algorithms, freshly proposed countermeasures, standards,
protocols and recorded databases for further analysis have
received upsurge attention, with varying degrees of spoof-
ing vulnerability, covering a range of attack scenarios and
acquisition conditions [13]. Methods are classified into three
categories, firstly, a real living body possess colour, texture,
elasticity and supplementary intrinsic properties, which can
be used to check the validity, human expressions, reflex and
involuntary signals are secondly grouped. Finally, coming
from traditional forensic environments, the collected trait is
examined for spotting clues of forgery of friction ridge skin
clarity. Academic and industrial projects choose the baseline,
plot the licit/normal scenarios and the error rates criteria for the
experiments, conducting on freely datasets, available for of-
fline work, containing samples for different modalities. Among
the most “overused” evaluated biometrics are fingerprints, iris
and face, due to their widely accepted distinctiveness [7].
Respectively, face presentation potential can be handled by
subject-specific 3D facial masks which analyze local binary
patterns based measures. A powerful way to eliminate similar
threats are the background motion correlation and texture of
the surrounding facial region quality measurements, something
that could be useful especially to more realistic scenarios [8].
For fingerprints, algorithms that can perform an analysis about
the capture of multiple samples of a biometric instance in
a short time frame are combined with those that allow live
detection and segmentation of the finger, including defenses
against gelatin, gummy and silicon samples and others that of-
fer processing of the photo with graphical operations, enabling
a convenient thought about how to capture multiple views of
modality from different fingers from one subject. The results
prove well-promising rates, even though the existence of a
purely incapable of being deceived climate system is simply
a utopia, under the current circumstances. A novel multi-
spectral approach to manage these challenges is to use the
proposed cascade structures as a part of a larger anti-spoofing
solution that involves multiple modalities from the user, his/her
movements to justify the presence, algorithms that overcome
the noises, simulate light reflections, determine the scene
motion, fixations, speed, acceleration, or even anticipate video
replay attacks. The developments may be evaluated through
test protocols, applied to more comprehensive databases, and
meanwhile the techniques should to be based on specific
frameworks, supporting larger scales and each generalization
need to be carefully controlled.
IV. MUTLI-BIOMETRIC CRYPTOSYSTEMS:
ATTACKS & RESISTANCE
The technologies of multi or single biometric cryptosystems
have been encountered to infiltrate systems, preventing from
some malicious performances, while remain exposed to classic
spoofing ones. Briefly, it is pointed out that a skillful adversary
has to know additional transform parameters or secret keys to
defeat the area with previously enrolled samples, since both
categories used to cooperate with helper data or are bound
to cryptographic techniques and tokens. In such a condition,
reconstruction of the original template, and consequently its
raw usage or the synthesization of fake physical biometrics,
is greatly complicated. The multi-modalities for one identity
offer the advantage of extremely low false acceptance attacks
in a tampering hypothesis. On the contrary, if a single trait
is compromised then the whole template can be recovered,
when a blended replacement attack take place, where subject
and attacker’s template and distinct parts of larger sets are
merged into one [4]. Cancellable approaches transform non/-
invertibly can unlock the genuine user’s biometric or some
elements of it, respectively [10]. Fuzzy commitment schemes
and vaults, which are related to entropy rates and wittily hiding
the biometric (e.g. minutiae and chaff points for fingerprints),
are vulnerable if the algorithms are poor. Helper data and key-
re-generation schemes extracting short keys or suffering from
improper accuracy present high tolerance, making achievable
the composition of an approximation of the initial biometric
from its hashes. Coercitive, device substitution intrusions and
any possible combination of serial venomous acts could be
applied sufficiently, compounding a worst-case scenario, but
rather unrealistic in everyday contexts.
Response-focused methodology on the basis of possibility
to integrate liveness detection or the mentioned anti-spoofing
methods includes experimental investigations to verify whether
and to what extent multi-modal verification systems could be
assessed as securely protected. Until now, studies on spoofing
underline that using multi-biometrics, the recognition perfor-
mance is higher but unfortunately unimodal approaches handle
better external attacks [2]. To reduce the risk of exposure of
the combined template, if a single trait revealed, the selection
of other biometrics, like hand-fingerprint, face-iris, instead of
multiple fingerprint samples, for example, is recommended,
based on empirical evidences. For increasing robustness, the
design of stronger fusion rules (score or feature level are
recommended) between samples is mandatory. Additionally,
cryptosystems and especially crypto-bio keys ideas for multi-
modalities are not only more efficient than mono-modal ones,
but simultaneously privacy friendly. These suggestions pretend
to bring some insight into the difficult problem of evaluation
through the effective countermeasures that can minimize the
effects of threats by taking into consideration the techniques of
fusion, the serial or parallel modes, the type of cryptographic
algorithms, complexion of the application according to the
hardware and its interconnects [9]. Finally, we emphasize that
any protection mechanism should respect design principles
and keep the overall balance of the system, without underes-
timating that extra efforts can bring about the cost of sharply
reduction of verification performance.
V. BIMODAL BIOMETRIC PERSON VERIFICATION SYSTEM
Citizens from dozens of nations have already acquired
their new electronic passport equipped with contactless chip
which stores personal data. The exponential growth of illegal
immigration crisis increases the cases of fraud, cloning and
identity theft with numerous social, economic and political
consequences [5], [7]. As a counterweight for the theoretical
analysis of the previous sections, Figure 3 introduces a bi-
modal biometric model for person identification made up of
face and fingerprint, or face and iris matchers. The framework
is a bold initiative in the deployment of three technologies:
crypto-biometrics, anti-spoofing countermeasures and Radio
Frequency Identification (RFID). This novel ePassport idea is
inspired by previous works on spoofing for biometrics [3] and
designs to defeat attacks through implementations of RFID
authentication protocols and data encryption, increasing the
complexity and therefore robustness [12], while cryptograph-
ically supporting the secrecy requirements for biometric data.
During enrollment a pair of datasets is collected. To preserve
the principals of protection of user’s privacy, the created tem-
plate consists of transformed minimal elements of the initial
biometrics binded together under a cryptographic algorithm
which uses them to create keys. The final information stored
on ePassport’s chip are the crypto-bio key, which can be
unlocked only when both biometrics are matched, traveler’s
personal details and document’s type, digital number, etc. The
description of the anti-spoofing verification system involves
liveness detection method combined with the current RFID
access control process. When a user approaches to an E-Gate
for automatic passport checking, video sequences are captured
by its cameras. Then the system requires the cooperation of
person who has to turn left or right the head and provide
his/her fingerprint to a sensor (or move eye to an iris move-
ment tracker). The three dimensional facial object as a result
Fig. 3. Flow chart of the proposed framework for person identification.
helps system to separate an alive human from a photo. The
matching parameters are scored under a fusion rule which its
optimal threshold depends on both of them, as a mechanism
against multi-biometric template threats [9]. After judgment,
the recognition procedure demands the use of final fusion score
to extract from the database (chip) the cryptographic key and
thus the informative content.
This deployment deserves a better analysis as it is just
the first step of next-generation identification systems. False
acceptance percentages for an imposter’s recognition, docu-
ment forgery and spoofing actions, under police presence are
considered as worst-case assumptions. The privacy impacts
and security issues in ePassports, even though they are a
charming field, are beyond the scope of this paper.
VI. CONCLUSION
The paper represents an attempt to acknowledge and account
for the schemes using combination of cryptography with
biometric characteristics and how this could play an increasing
role in electronic documents and transactions for identifying
a person, limiting security risks. However, many methods and
their current design suffer from vulnerabilities, and here is
where measures become crucial in order to protect schemes
and the overall efficiency of government and commercial ap-
plications. Spoofing attacks at the sensor level of a system used
for automatic recognition of people by their biometric charac-
teristics have been tackled by independent and/or collaborated
to initial design and application, anti-spoofing attempts [11].
To appraise data protection problems, multi-modalities, current
research developments on suggestions against invasive actions
and a prototype face-fingerprint/iris cryptosystem have been
presented. Create an all-inclusive view, we believe that this
work will help to better evaluate the impact of spoofing attacks
from a security and privacy engineering aspect, contributing
to ongoing and expected attempts in pattern recognition area.
In the general atmosphere of the outcome, the application of
biometrics in different services requires high accuracy rates,
secure personal information storage and reliable generation of
data while the whole process of transfer is proof. Identity thief
might exploit in occasion of low protection levels. For some
conditions, even if anti-spoofing measures could adequately
assessed, the rapid progress of adversaries’ actions at the initial
steps of verification purposes throw up wider concerns on
public narratives of privacy and general monitor of individuals.
The advancement of theory on secured access control and
practical design implementations of the provided valuable
experience on technologies will improve their robustness.
VII. FUTURE RESEARCH
Directions for further research and open issues may be
focused on anti-spoofing techniques for biometric modalities
and their multi-modal combinations, seeking to reduce the
different degrees about deception/lying, while enhancing the
proper function of the system. An anti-spoofing method is
not constructed to operate as a stand-alone procedure but
together with the biometric recognition system. The design
of the system must be in a way that does not suffer from error
recognition rates itself. Cryptography can offer significant, but
inadequate solutions in this emerging technology, and thus
next steps on encryption schemes may promote the security
strength against intrusive attacks. Multi-modal systems can be
easily cracked by spoofing only one trait and future works
should definitely investigate how to bring robust results on
score level fusion rules and provide protocols for provable
secure authentication based on template protection schemes.
From another angle, state-of-the-art suggests the use of
databases for spoofing and anti-spoofing analysis but still
lacks to cover all the possible scenarios and certainly the
implementation in real-world applications. The problem of
generalization should be addressed as well, due to the fact
that current findings may cover individual occasions for some
biometric traits leaving gaps to varying areas of a system
that verifies or identifies biometrically users. Concurrently, the
missing pieces of the puzzle for the best case approaches may
lie at the combination of different algorithms and anti-spoofing
countermeasures. Liveness detection efforts, and challenge
approaches with the cooperation of user, could be tested to
offer advantages against tricks that can fool existing systems.
Apart from design ideas and open research questions on
the protected operation of the system, further research should
cover the major themes of human privacy and rights to
anonymization, facing the obstacles of societal suspicions
over surveillance, and any other specified and legitimate
services. Finally, like in most of the affairs, the starting setup
is vital for the entire field. Human biometrics may be collected
and processed under detailed protocols, only compatible and
accordingly related to the scope of the authority involved in
the transaction, always respecting proportionality and serving
the forensic experts thoughts on the prevention of spoofing
may profit more from a careful appraisal of the processes
supporting the structure of the biometric system.
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